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REMARKS

Claims 1–34 are pending in the present application. In the Office Action mailed April 21, 2004, the Examiner rejected claims 1–10 and 13–34 under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Conway (USP 5,732,401) in view of Cook et al. (USP6,668,203). The Examiner next rejected claims 11 and 12 under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Conway and Cook et al. and further in view of Gidwani (USP 6,640,239).

Premature Finality

The finality of the Office Action mailed April 21, 2004, is premature and must be withdrawn. That is, “[u]nder present practice, second or any subsequent actions on the merits shall be final except where the Examiner introduces a new grounds of rejection that is neither necessitated by applicant’s amendment of the claims nor based on information submitted in an information disclosure statement.” MPEP §706.07(a). In the previous Office Action mailed November 18, 2003, the Examiner proffered a rejection of claims 1, 3, 4, 7, 8, 17, 18, and 24 under §102(b) as being anticipated by Conway, claims 2, 5, 9, 10, 13–16, 19–23, and 25–31 under §103(a) as being unpatentable over Conway, and claims 11 and 12 under §103(a) as being unpatentable over Conway in view of Gidwani. Responsive to that Action, Applicant amended claims 1, 5, 9, 14, 17, 25 and added new claims 32–34. Therefore, claims 2–4, 6–8, 10–13, 15, 16, 18–24, and 26–31 were not and have not been amended. Furthermore, no Information Disclosure Statement was submitted subsequent to the November 18, 2003, Action.

In the immediately subsequent and current Office Action mailed April 21, 2004, the Examiner made the Action final despite the fact that all claims were rejected under a new grounds of rejection including Cook et al. In fact, the Examiner acknowledged that a new grounds of rejection was presented in the Response to Arguments Section of the Office Action. Therefore, while the Examiner cited MPEP §706.07(a) when presenting the finality of the Action, the Examiner failed to follow the requirements of this section of the MPEP, which explicitly states that the Examiner may not make an Action final “when the Examiner introduces a new grounds of rejection that is neither necessitated by applicant’s amendment of the claims nor based on information submitted in an information disclosure statement.” As numerous claims are as originally filed, the Examiner cannot contend that the new grounds of rejection is necessitated by Applicant’s amendment. Simply, wherein the

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Examiner introduces a new grounds of rejection not necessitated by Applicant and even a single dependent claim remains as originally filed, the Examiner may not make that Action final under MPEP §706.07(a). Therefore, the finality of the Office Action mailed April 21, 2004, is premature and must be removed.

Claim Rejections

Inherency

The Examiner relied on an assertion of inherency in proffering the current rejection. Specifically, the Examiner stated that “[i]t is therefore *inherent* that Cook et al teach the step of identifying devices in need of repair.” (Emphasis added). The Examiner must provide rational or evidence tending to show the asserted inherency. See MPEP §2112. Furthermore, “[t]he fact that a certain result or characteristic may occur or be present in the prior art is not sufficient to establish the inherency of that result or characteristic.” *In re Rijckaert*, 9 F.3d 1531, 1534, 28 USPQ2d 1955, 1957 (Fed. Cir. 1993); *In re Oelrich*, 666 F.2d 578, 581-82, 212 USPQ 323, 326 (CCPA 1981). Simply, in proffering a rejection relying on inherency the Examiner must first overcome a heavy burden. Specifically:

To establish inherency, the extrinsic evidence “must make clear that the missing descriptive matter is necessarily present in the thing described in the reference, and that it would be so recognized by persons of ordinary skill. Inherency, however, may not be established by probabilities or possibilities. The mere fact that a certain thing may result from a given set of circumstances is not sufficient.”

MPEP §2112, *In re Robertson*, 169 F.3d 743, 745, 49 USPQ2d 1949, 1950-51 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (citation omitted).

Therefore, “[i]n relying upon the theory of inherency, the examiner must provide a basis in fact and/or technical reasoning to reasonably support the determination that the allegedly inherent characteristic necessarily flows from the teachings of the applied prior art.” *Ex parte Levy*, 17 USPQ2d 1461, 1464 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1990) (emphasis in original). It therefore follows that the Examiner must provide objective evidence or cogent technical reasoning to support the conclusion of inherency or the rejection fails and must be withdrawn.

In the case at hand, the Examiner relied on a conclusion of inherency but failed to provide reasoning, rational, or evidence of any kind. The Examiner did not support the

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conclusion of inherency. Therefore, the conclusion of inherency fails because the Examiner did not meet the requisite burden and the rejection must be withdrawn.

Nonfunctional Descriptive Material

The Examiner asserted that although numerous claim elements were not taught or suggested by the art of record, the Examiner gave no consideration to these elements because, in the Examiner's interpretation, the differences "are only found in the nonfunctional descriptive material" and therefore, "do not distinguish the claimed invention from the prior art in terms of patentability." To support this conclusion, the Examiner cited *In re Gulack* and *In re Lowry*. 703 F.2d 1381, 217 USPQ 401 (Fed. Cir. 1983) and 32 F.3d 1579, 32 USPQ2d 1031 (Fed. Cir. 1994).

The Examiner asserted this position in a previous Office Action mailed November 18, 2003. Responsive thereto, Applicant encouraged the Examiner to locate and read both *In re Gulack* and *In re Lowry*. Specifically, upon even a cursory review of the cited cases, it is abundantly apparent that the Examiner's position cannot be sustained. That is, it appears that the Examiner has attempted to apply the "printed matter rejection" under §103 articulated in *In re Gulack*, 703 F.2d at 1385 n.8. However, *In re Gulack* and *In re Lowry* are both explicit that such rejections should not be used liberally. *Id.* and 32 F.3d at 1584. The *In re Lowry* Court chastised the PTO for erroneously applying a "printed matter rejection" because "printed matter cases have no factual relevance where 'the invention as defined by the claims requires that the information be processed not by the mind but by a machine, computer.'" 32 F.3d at 1582 citing *In re Bernhart*, 417 F.2d 1395, 1399, 163 USPQ 611, 615 (CCPA 1969) (emphasis added). Therefore, under both *In re Gulack* and *In re Lowry*, since the current claims require processing by a computer and not the human mind, the Examiner is "not at liberty to ignore such limitations." 32 F.3d at 1584.

Therefore, Applicant requests the Examiner afford all claim elements patentable consideration as is required under the MPEP, C.F.R., U.S.C., and substantive case law on point. Should the Examiner continue to disregard these requirements, Applicant requests that the Examiner provide detailed reasoning and support for the Examiner's position.

Obviousness

The burden of establishing a *prima facie* case of obviousness falls on the Examiner. MPEP §2142. Obviousness cannot be established by combining the teachings of the prior art

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to produce the claimed invention absent some teaching or suggestion supporting the combination. *ACS Hospital Systems, Inc. v. Montefiore Hospital*, 732 F.2d 1572, 1577, 221 U.S.P.Q. 929, 933 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Accordingly, to establish a *prima facie* case, the Examiner must not only show that the combination includes each and every element of the claimed invention, but also provide "a convincing line of reasoning as to why the artisan would have found the claimed invention to have been obvious in light of the teachings of the references." *Ex parte Clapp*, 227 USPQ 972, 973 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1985). "The fact that references can be combined or modified is not sufficient to establish *prima facie* obviousness." *Id.*

The Examiner failed to show that the cited combination teaches or suggests each and every element of each and every claim as required under MPEP §2143. Therefore, the current rejection falls short of this burden and, as will be shown, claims 1-34 are in condition for allowance.

Regarding claim 1, the Examiner rejected the claim as unpatentable over Conway in view of Cook et al. In the Office Action mailed November 18, 2003, the Examiner asserted that Conway discloses a system that *inherently* "alerts the user to devices requiring immediate attention and of devices requiring routine attention." The Examiner acknowledged that any such alerting of the user is inherent because Conway fails to disclose communicating any such alerts other than to state that "detailed cost analysis information...may be reported to an operator through a display monitor 34 or generated on a printer 36." Col. 4, lns. 64-66. In the current Office Action mailed April 21, 2004, the Examiner rebuffed the previously asserted position and stated that "Conway teaches that the GUI displays the time of the next scheduled maintenance (see col. 9, lincs 24-33)." (Emphasis added). This statement is not only wholly inconsistent with the Examiner's previous position but contravenes that directly taught by Conway. Conway does not teach any GUI at all – let alone a GUI to display the time of the next scheduled maintenance, as asserted by the Examiner. The Examiner is reminded that in order to "teach," the reference must make explicit statement to that end. Therefore, the Examiner's statement that "Conway discloses a system and method for...collecting...data...and displaying it on a graphical user interface (34)" is misleading at best. Conway does not teach a GUI. Rather, Conway teaches

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a display. See Fig. 1, no. 34. One of ordinary skill in the art will readily recognize that a display is not the same as a GUI.

Specifically, one of ordinary skill in the art will readily recognize that a GUI is a conglomeration of information specifically displayed in a manner that, by definition, is to be interacted with by a user. That is, a GUI is organized and designed to (1) arrange a variety of information for conveying to a user and (2) allow interaction and interfacing of the user with the information through the GUI. On the other hand, a display is simply a passive device. That is, while a display is configured to convey information to a user, a display does not necessarily allow user interfacing and interaction as does a GUI. Displays have existed well prior to the advent and introduction of GUIs.

Nevertheless, assuming *arguendo* that the system of Conway may suggest displaying diagnostic data and device reminder data as claimed, Conway does not teach or suggest any particular GUI in which such data could be displayed. Claim 1, in part, calls for a particular system for managing the diagnostic data and device reminder data and the GUI within which the diagnostic data and device reminder data are displayed. That is, claim 1 calls for "remotely collecting condition data representative of device status for a number of devices utilized in an institution, the condition data segregated into device diagnostic data and device reminder data." Therefore, the condition data collected is segregated into two categories: namely, device diagnostic data and device reminder data. Conway fails to teach or suggest any such segregation. These elements specifically call for the complex interactive and interfacing capabilities of the GUI, of which the display of Conway is clearly incapable.

As such, the Examiner applied a new reference, Cook et al., and asserted that Cook et al. teaches "the step of separately displaying and identifying the device diagnostic data." However, while Cook et al. teaches displaying in a manner to allow comparison of "declared processes" and "actual process," Cook et al. does not teach or suggest "the step of separately displaying and identifying the device diagnostic data," as claimed, because Cook et al. does not teach receiving or compiling "device diagnostic data." Specifically, Cook et al. teaches a system for monitoring "activities" and is explicit that "an activity should be visible to an inspector at the facility; that is, an inspector should be able to tell by inspection whether or not an activity has occurred." Col. 6, lns. 5-8. On the other hand, the claimed invention calls for "separately displaying and identifying on a graphical user

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interface (GUI) the device diagnostic data and the device reminder data.” When interpreted in light of the specification, it is clear that the device diagnostic data and the device reminder data is not limited to “activity” that is “visible to an inspector.” Simply, as in Figs. 6–7, the data may include information from “marketing and sales messaging” 222a, “yield personal messaging systems” 222b, “customer authorized information systems” 222c, “network monitoring system” 224a, “asset tracking systems” 224b, “incident tracking systems” 224c, “financial systems” 224d, and “remote diagnostic systems” 224e. Additionally, the Specification is clear that alerts may “include an indication that a particular device of the medical instructions suffered a power failure or an indication that a particular mobile item is out of its allowable range.” Specification, pg. 19. One of ordinary skill in the art will readily recognize that data from the above-cited systems is well outside the scope of an “activity” that is “visible to an inspector,” as required by Cook et al. Col. 6, lns. 5–8. That is, a person is incapable of visually verifying that a previous power failure has occurred or that a wireless device has moved out of range.

Therefore, claim 1 includes elements that are not taught or suggested by the art of record and, as such, is patentably distinct from the art of record. As such, claims 2–8 are in condition for allowance pursuant to the chain of dependency. However, it should be noted that claims 2–8 include elements that are additionally distinguishable over the art of record.

For example, claim 3 calls for “indicating on the GUI the devices requiring immediate attention including identifying the devices in need of repair, servicing, and updating.” The Examiner acknowledged that Conway does not teach or suggest that which is claimed but stated that Applicant’s arguments in this regard are “moot in view of the new grounds of rejection.” However, upon a review of the “new grounds of rejection” it is readily apparent that the Examiner has not proffered a proper rejection. That is, though Cook et al. does not teach or suggest that which is claimed, the Examiner concluded that “[i]t is therefore inherent that Cook et al teach the step of identifying devices in need of repair.” (Emphasis added). As shown above, this is improper because a conclusion of inherency requires the Examiner to overcome a stiff evidentiary burden that clearly has not been met. Therefore, claim 3 includes elements not taught or suggested by the art of record and is patentably distinct.

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Additionally, claim 4 calls for "displaying on the GUI a reminder profile including a list of devices that require routine attention." The Examiner entirely failed to address the elements of claim 4. Neither Conway nor Cook et al. teach such "a reminder profile." As such, claim 4 is patentably distinct from the art of record.

Regarding claim 5, the claim, in part, calls for "displaying on the GUI news updates relating to the devices in the medical institutions." The Examiner acknowledged that "Conway fails to teach the step of displaying general remarks and news updates regarding the device." However, the Examiner concluded that because, in his interpretation, the differences "are only found in the nonfunctional descriptive material," the claim elements "do not distinguish the claimed invention from the prior art in terms of patentability." To support this conclusion, the Examiner then cited *In re Gulack* and *In re Lowry*. As previously shown, the Examiner has erroneously applied the precedence of *In re Gulack* and *In re Lowry* and upon proper consideration of all elements of claim 5, it is clear that the claim is patentably distinct from the art of record.

Similarly, regarding claim 6, which calls for "displaying news links to a number of news GUIs configured to display information about one of a device, a device technology, and a device development," the Examiner must afford these elements patentable consideration. As previously explained, Conway does not teach extrapolating, displaying, or otherwise communicating information other than information specific to tracking and controlling cost. See Col. 4, lns. 64-66 and Col. 25, lns. 1-8. Therefore, Conway does not teach or suggest "displaying news links to a number of news GUIs configured to display information about one of a device, a device technology, and a device development." Additionally, Cook et al. is explicitly limited to information regarding "activities" that are "visible to an inspector." Col. 6, lns. 5-8. Therefore, the claimed news links are well outside that which is taught or suggested by Cook et al. As such, claim 6 is patentably distinct from the art of record above and beyond the chain of dependency.

Regarding claim 9, the Examiner failed to expressly address that which is claimed. Rather, the Examiner summarily dismissed claim 9, as well as the other independent claims, simultaneously. This, too, is improper. In order to establish a *prima facie* case of obviousness, the Examiner carries the burden of showing that the art of record teaches or suggests each and every element of each and every claim. MPEP §2143.

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Claim 9 calls for a GUI and further defines the elements displayed in the GUI. As previously stated, Conway does not teach any GUIs whatsoever. Rather, Conway simply states that information to be communicated to an operator may be displayed on a monitor but fails to teach or suggest any method of displaying or particular manner in which to display information. Col. 4, lns 64-66. As such, Conway does not teach or suggest any of the elements called for in claim 9 that define the specific information within and manner of displaying the GUI.

Similarly, Cook et al. does not teach or suggest any particular GUI for communicating information. Nonetheless, claim 9 calls for the GUI to include three particular sections and defines some of the information included in each section. Specifically, claim 9 calls for "an alert section having a number of alert indicators configured to indicate urgent items relating to a device, a reminder section having a number of reminder indicators configured to display scheduled items relating to the device, and a general information section having a number of general information textlinks configured to display product updates and technology news specific to the device." Neither Conway nor Cook et al. teaches or suggests any particular GUI and certainly does not teach or suggest that any GUI include the specific elements affirmatively called for in claim 9. The Examiner cannot simply ignore claim elements. The MPEP is clear that to establish a *prima facie* case of obviousness, the Examiner carries the burden of affirmatively showing that that the art of record teaches or suggests each and every element of each and every claim. MPEP §2143. The Examiner has clearly failed to meet this burden; therefore, claim 9 is patentably distinct from the art of record.

Regarding claim 12, the claim calls for "a number of the alert indicators, a number of the reminder indicators, and a number of general information textlinks are further configured to link a user upon selection to a number of information specific GUIs." Again, as Conway does not teach a GUI of any kind, Conway certainly does not teach or suggest a GUI having a number of indicators and a number of textlinks configured to link a user to other information specific GUIs. Furthermore, Cook et al. does not teach or suggest any such GUI having "a number of the alert indicators, a number of the reminder indicators, and a number of general information textlinks are further configured to link a user upon selection to a number of information specific GUIs." Again, the Examiner cannot simply choose to ignore claim

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elements. As such, claim 12 is patentably distinct from the art of record above and beyond the chain of dependency.

Regarding claim 14, it appears that the Examiner once more improperly concluded that, under *In re Gulack* and *In re Lowry*, the Examiner could disregard claim elements because "the names of the tabs constitutes nonfunctional descriptive material." However, as previously shown, the Examiner is "not at liberty to ignore such limitations." *In re Lowry*, 32 F.3d at 1584. Therefore, upon proper review of the claim elements, it is clear that claim 14 is patentably distinct from the art of record in that Conway does not teach or suggest a GUI having any such tabs nor such tabs configured to link a user to a number of service GUIs, as claimed. As such, claim 14 is patentably distinct from the art of record above and beyond the chain of dependency.

Regarding claim 17, the Examiner has failed to show that the combination of Conway and Cook et al. teaches or suggests each and every element of the claim. Claim 17, in part, calls for the "display of the condition data and the reminder data on a refreshable graphical user interface (GUI)." As previously shown, Conway does not teach the display of such information in any GUI and Cook et al. does not teach or suggest any GUI configuration or the display of data outside of "activity" data that can be visually verified by an operator. Col. 6, lns. 5-8. Therefore, since Conway does not teach any GUI, Conway certainly does not teach a refreshable GUI configured to display condition data and reminder data. Additionally, Conway does not teach or suggest any GUI to display condition data and reminder data. Rather, Conway teaches that only "cost figures" and other information to track and control cost are communicated. Col. 25, lns. 1-8. Furthermore, Cook et al. does not teach or suggest condition data and the reminder data because such is outside the scope of Cook et al. as limited to visually verifiable activities.

Also, claim 17 calls for, in part, a plurality of devices in a remote medical facility connected to a consolidation facility and a computer programmed to "enable data transmission to the remote medical facility in addition to the display of the condition data and the reminder data on the refreshable GUI." As such, claim 17 is clear that the claimed system is capable of not only receiving data from the remote medical facility but is also capable of transmitting data, other than the display of condition and reminder data, back to the remote medical facility. While Conway does teach receiving data forwarded from a

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remote medical facility or patient care facility 350, 352 at a central monitoring center 354, Conway does not teach or suggest that the central monitoring center 354 is capable of sending data back to the patient care facilities 350, 352 or that the patient care facilities 350, 352 are capable of receiving data from the central monitoring center 354. Col. 25, lns. 9-32.

Specifically, Conway teaches unidirectional communication from patient care facilities 350, 352 to the central monitoring center 354. Specifically, the two embodiments disclosed by Conway for effectuating communication from the patient care facilities 350, 352 to the central monitoring center 354 are limited to forwarding "cost tracking information" or forwarding mere raw tag readings. *Id.* Nowhere does Conway teach or suggest enabling "data transmission to the remote medical facility in addition to the display of the condition data and the reminder data on the refreshable GUI."

Furthermore, Cook et al. does not teach or suggest any such "data transmission to the remote medical facility in addition to the display of the condition data and the reminder data on the refreshable GUI." In fact, the Examiner failed to address this element of the claim with respect to Cook et al. Therefore, it seems apparent that the Examiner acknowledged that Cook et al. fails to teach or suggest that which is claimed.

For at least these reasons, claim 17 is patentably distinct from the art of record. As such, claims 18-24 are in condition for allowance pursuant to the chain of dependency.

Regarding claim 18, the claim calls for the computer to be "further programmed to determine a number of devices in need of immediate attention." While Conway does teach a system that includes database entries for tracking information such as "Next Maint Date" 139, "Next Maint. Use" 141, and Next Maint. Time" 143, Conway does not teach or suggest any means configured to determine "a number of devices in need of immediate attention." First, Conway does not teach or suggest utilizing the above-cited database entries for anything more than compiling cost tracking data. See Col. 4, lns. 64-66 and Col. 25, lns. 1-8. Second, even if Conway were to provide a means to extrapolate more than cost tracking data from the database, Conway does not teach or suggest any criteria for determining "a number of devices in need of immediate attention." That is, as explicitly explained in the Preferred Embodiment Section of the present application, devices in need of immediate attention may include "an indication that a particular device of the medical institution suffered a power failure or an indication that a particular mobile item is out of its allowable

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range" beyond the fact that devices in need of immediate attention might include a device in need of calibration to ensure proper functioning or a device approaching its performance limit or preventive maintenance schedule date. Application, pg. 19, ¶1.

Additionally, the Examiner failed to address this element of the claim with respect to Cook et al. Therefore, it seems apparent that the Examiner acknowledged that Cook et al. fails to teach or suggest that which is claimed. As such, claim 18 includes subject matter that is patentably distinct from the art of record above and beyond the chain of dependency.

Regarding claim 20, the Examiner recognized that "Conway does not teach marketing data, customer-entered data, and messages are consolidated." However, as previously explained in detail, the Examiner improperly concluded that such limitations may be ignored. See *In re Lowry*, 32 F.3d at 1584. Upon proper review and consideration of these elements it is readily apparent that neither Conway nor Cook et al. teach and/or suggest that which is claimed. As such, claim 20 is patentably distinct from the art of record above and beyond the chain of dependency.

Regarding claim 21, the claim calls for the systems to include "network monitoring systems" and "news providing systems." Neither Conway nor Cook et al. teach or suggest any network monitoring systems or news providing systems. However, the Examiner failed to even address these elements. As such, the Examiner has clearly failed to establish a *prima facie* case of obviousness. For all of these reasons, claim 21 is patentably distinct from the art of record above and beyond the chain of dependency.

Regarding claim 23, given that specific elements of the claim were unaddressed, it appears that the Examiner concluded that the Examiner was at liberty to ignore the elements of the claim given the Examiner's misapplication and misinterpretation of *In re Gulack* and *In re Lowry*. However, as previously shown, the Examiner is "not at liberty to ignore such limitations." *In re Lowry*, 32 F.3d at 1584. Therefore, as neither Conway nor Cook et al. teach or suggest a computer programmed "to display on the GUI general information including industry news, device news, technology news, and news relating to the remote facility," claim 23 is patentably distinct from the art of record above and beyond the chain of dependency.

Claim 25, in part, calls for manually entered data to be acquired from "both the remote facility and remotely from the remote facility." Conway teaches a system where data

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is acquired at a caregiver monitoring center 354 from patient care facilities 350, 352 but does not teach or suggest that data may be acquired from anywhere other than the patient care facilities 350, 352. Col. 25, lns. 9–32. Furthermore, Cook et al. teaches away from manual data entry by stating that all data is gathered by sensor data rather than manually. In fact, Cook et al. states that “[s]ince the sensor data from a remote power plant is typically examined by hand, the ability to extract what processes actually occurred from raw data is a vast improvement in speed, repeatability, fineness of the analysis, and accuracy, compared to manual analysis.” Col. 5, lns. 42–46. Therefore, Cook et al. precludes manual data entry/analysis. As such, claim 25 is patentably distinct from the art of record.

Regarding claims 32-34, the Examiner failed to address that which is claimed. The MPEP is clear that to establish a *prima facie* case of obviousness, the Examiner carries the burden of affirmatively showing that that the art of record teaches or suggests each and every element of each and every claim. MPEP §2143. The Examiner has clearly failed to meet this burden; therefore, no basis for rejection of claims 32- 34 remains.

Conclusion

In closing, from the context of the Examiner’s rejections and the art of record, it appears that the Examiner believes Applicant is purporting to have invented a method and system of electronically displaying data relating to a healthcare facility. Applicant is not claiming inventorship of such a generic system. Applicant acknowledges that the art includes teaching of such a generic system. In contrast to the known art, Applicant claims a specific method and system of gathering, processing, analyzing, and conveying specific data. The art neither teaches nor suggests the claimed method and system. Moreover, it is this specificity in the invention as set forth explicitly in the claims that the Examiner has ignored.

To further clarify this point, Applicant offers the following analogy. A number of techniques are recognized in the art for providing power to a load. In general, these techniques, by definition, require an electrical link and an energy source. The differences in these techniques lie in the details of how the links are configured, controlled, managed, connected, etc. As the Examiner can appreciate, the Patent Office has issued a plethora of patents where the providing of power is claimed. The novelty of these patents is in the details of how the power is provided. The same is true in the present application. The patentability lies in the detail of what type of data is gathered, how it is gathered, how it is

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
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analyzed, and how it is used and conveyed. And it is these details that define the present invention over the art of record.

Therefore, in light of at least the foregoing, Applicant respectfully believes that the present application is in condition for allowance. As a result, Applicant respectfully requests timely issuance of a Notice of Allowance for claims 1-34.

Applicant appreciates the Examiner's consideration of these Amendments and Remarks and cordially invites the Examiner to call the undersigned, should the Examiner consider any matters unresolved.

Respectfully submitted,



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